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Abstract The Fraud Bill, which received Royal Assent on 8 November
2006, created an offence of fraud in English criminal law which marks a
departure of utmost significance from the approach adopted hitherto,
whereby a number of related offences cover behaviour deemed to amount
to fraud. To mark the passage of the Fraud Act 2006 into law, this article
examines the references which were made during its consideration in
Parliament to fraud as activity which is serious and which is often erro-
neously portrayed as ‘victimless’ crime. In joining these key criminal
policy-making debates with academic study of white-collar crime, it will
be suggested that as yet too little attention is being paid to ‘ambiguous’
popular perceptions of financial crimes for there to be confidence that
the fraud offence will, in the words of the current Solicitor-General, ‘get
the law right’.
In 1998 the Law Commission was instructed to ‘examine the law relat-
ing to fraud . . . and to make recommendations to improve the law . . .
with all due expedition’.1 The resulting Consultation Paper published in
1999 Legislating the Criminal Code, Fraud and Deception shows clearly the
Law Commission’s appreciation that in the 21st century, challenges
arising from the ‘problem of fraud’ owe much to the combination of its
base elements of deceit and motivation for securement of advantage or
causing loss2 with the social and economic conditions of the late 20th
century, and especially the ‘radical and multifarious advances in the use
of modern technology’.3 The Law Commission explained that this pre-
sents considerable difficulties for framing law which is able to ‘keep up’,
let alone to stay ‘one step ahead’, of fraud, as fraudulent activity can
and does evolve quickly, especially in a fast-changing world.4 It also
stressed that this is a world in which technological advances have
ensured electronic means of communication and commercial transac-
tion are commonplace across spheres of everyday life as well as business
activity.5
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Notwithstanding the regulatory challenges arising, the Law Commis-
sion was insistent that the consequences of failing to address the prob-
lem of fraud in this context would be severe. It illustrated this by
reference to the Institute of Chartered Accountants’ assessment that
‘business fraud is a growing problem that affects everyone . . . [t]he cost
to the country is huge in terms of those who have to pay for it and the
loss of reputation as a safe place to do business’.6 The Law Commission
was instructed to consider whether existing law relating to fraud was
comprehensible to juries; adequate for effective prosecution; and fair to
potential defendants, but also explicitly whether it met ‘the need of
developing transfers’, to determine whether it was sufficiently flexible
to be applicable to new scenarios.7 The accompanying instruction to
make recommendations with all ‘due expedition’ included the direct
request that it consider the merits of introducing a general offence of
fraud into English criminal law. This commenced the extensive inquiry
into the criminal law relating to fraud which culminated in the Fraud
Bill which was first introduced in Parliament in May 2005, following
recommendations made in the Law Commission’s Report on Fraud pub-
lished in 2002,8 and government consultation in 2004.9 Following fur-
ther parliamentary consideration during 2006, the Bill which stated in
its preamble that it was to ‘make provision for, and in connection with
criminal liability for fraud and obtaining services dishonestly’,10 received
Royal Assent on 8 November 2006.
For criminal lawyers, the Fraud Act’s main import lies in the way in
which it will fundamentally alter the approach to financial crime tradi-
tionally adopted in criminal law. Solicitor-General Mike O’Brien told the
House of Commons in June 2006 that the Bill is a measure which has
been eagerly awaited by prosecutors and by the police, and this was
because it ‘should improve the prosecution process by reducing the
chance of offences being wrongly charged, and provide greater flex-
ibility to keep pace with the increasing use of technology in crimes of
fraud’. In contrast Mr O’Brien also made reference to the way in which
‘strange as it may seem . . . [w]hen lawyers talk of fraud, we refer
collectively to a wide and complex array of deception and theft offences
. . . and common law, [which] compiled somewhat haphazardly, have
the task of encompassing the wide range of fraudulent conduct’.11
Alluding to the absence of any offence of fraud either under statute or at
common law, this need for a new approach was recognised by the Law
6 Ibid. at para. 1.9.
7 Ibid. at para. 1.1.
8 Law Commission, Report on Fraud, Law Com. No. 276, Cm 5560 (2002) (hereafter
Report on Fraud).
9 Fraud Law Reform—Consultation on Proposals for Legislation launched by Baroness
Scotland on 17 May 2004, and Fraud Law Reform: Government Response to
Consultations published in October 2004.
10 The full text of the Fraud Act 2006 can be found at www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/
60035--a.htm#1.
11 Hansard, col. 534, 12 June 2006.
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Commission in its insistence in 2002 that the law was in need of reform,
and that a ‘Fresh Approach’ was required.12
In the course of emphasising the need to thwart the ‘inexhaustible
ingenuity’ of fraudsters,13 in 2002 the Law Commission proposed that
pursuing reform through specific offences was likely to continue the
position whereby the law would be ‘always lagging behind develop-
ments in technology and commerce’.14 Following government consulta-
tion and parliamentary debate, the Fraud Act’s ‘centrepiece’ offence
mirrors closely the Law Commission’s recommendations for a statutory
general fraud offence.15 The offence seeks to capture base elements of
fraud, but to do so in a manner which is deliberately not attached to any
specific activity which might arise from the ‘modern methods by which
dishonest activity may be effected’.16 And accordingly, what are now
ss 1–5 of the Fraud Act provide that a person is guilty of fraud if he
dishonestly makes a false representation;17 fails to disclose information
while under a legal duty to do so;18 or abuses a position in which he is
expected to safeguard or at least not to prejudice the financial interests
of another,19 and in the commission of any of these matters intends to
make a gain or expose another to loss.20
The scope of the Fraud Act and its intended function
and purpose
Although this article is most interested in the fraud offence, the scope of
the Fraud Act is wider, and includes the offence of obtaining services
dishonestly which is also intended to apply widely across commercial
and everyday life activities.21 There is also liability for being in possession
of articles for use in frauds, and making or supplying articles for use in
frauds.22 The new offence of ‘Participating in a fraudulent business
carried on by a sole trader’ intends to extend liability which can already
12 This is the heading adopted in Part VI of the Law Commission’s Report on Fraud, at
57.
13 Report on Fraud, para. 7.1.
14 Ibid. at para. 7.3.
15 See Solicitor-General Mike O’Brien’s observations on the way in which most of
the changes proposed by the Law Commission had ‘found their way into the Bill’:
Hansard, col. 534, 12 June 2006.
16 Lord Falconer of Thoroton ‘Commercial Fraud or Sharp Practice—Challenge for
the Law’, Denning Lecture (14 October 1997), quoted in Legislating the Criminal
Code, para. 1.3.
17 Further illumination of false representation can be found in s 2 of the new Act,
and in the Explanatory Notes which accompanied the Bill (published by the Home
Office (29 March 2006)).
18 Further illumination of disclosure while under a legal duty can be found in s. 3 of
the Act and Explanatory Notes published in relation to the Bill.
19 Further illumination of abuse of position can be found in s. 4 of the Act, and the
Explanatory Notes.
20 According to s. 5 ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ extend only to that of money or other property,
but include gain or loss which is temporary or permanent. It explains that ‘gain’
includes a gain achieved by keeping what one has as well as gaining that which
one does not; and ‘loss’ includes a loss by not getting what one might get as well
as loss by parting with what one has.
21 See the provisions of s. 11, and the Explanatory Notes, paras 34–36.
22 Pursuant to ss 6 and 7 respectively.
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be incurred in respect of a company, where a business is carried on with
intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other
person, or for any fraudulent purpose.23 Penalties across the new Act
reflect current political concerns for the need to address the way in
which, according to former Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine, ‘. . . the public
has at times felt that those responsible for major crimes in the commer-
cial sphere have managed to avoid justice’.24 This sentiment in turn
echoed the views of Lord Roskill from over a decade earlier that the way
in which serious fraud appeared to escape detection or successful prose-
cution had served only to ‘encourage its growth, with potentially harm-
ful consequences’.25 The Fraud Bill matches the substantive law with the
consequences of allowing the perpetration of fraud to flourish by pro-
viding that the fraud offence will carry a maximum penalty of 10 years’
imprisonment for those convicted on indictment.26
This is clearly a strong message against tolerance of fraud, but equally,
during its consideration before Parliament, ministers were very keen to
clarify that the Fraud Bill was part of a much more extensive and more
ambitious package of measures to combat fraud. According to the
Solicitor-General, the aim of the Fraud Bill was to ‘get the law right’27
but that, alongside this, the government is equally concerned with
improving the investigation of fraud by the police and other agencies,28
and ensuring that the criminal courts are able to deal effectively and
expeditiously with trial proceedings.29 While accepting that the fraud
offence—and even the Act within which it is now located—is not
intended to be a ‘standalone’ initiative, this article is concerned with
whether the new fraud offence will be able to ‘get the law right’. It will
open up some thoughts on whether the fraud offence can be expected to
deliver an effective, widely applicable, and yet flexible mechanism for
determining criminal liability for fraud. In this spirit, it is particularly
interested in the issues which might arise from the manner in which it
will be established that a defendant—in making a false representation;
in failing to disclose information; or by abusing a position of trust—has
committed fraud. The transformation of this conduct into criminal fraud
23 According to s. 458 of the Companies Act 1985, ‘If any business of a company is
carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any
other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, every person who was knowingly a
party to the carrying on of the business in that manner is liable to imprisonment
or a fine, or both. This applies whether or not the company has been, or is in the
course of being, wound up.’ The new offence regarding sole traders is to be found
in s. 9 of the new Act.
24 Lord Irvine, quoted in Legislating the Criminal Code, para. 1.4.
25 Fraud Trials Committee Report, chaired by E. Wentworth, Bart., Lord Roskill (HMSO:
London, 1986) 2.
26 According to s. 1(3), a person found guilty of fraud is liable on summary
conviction to imprisonment of up to 12 months and or to a fine up to the
statutory maximum; or upon conviction on indictment to imprisonment of up to
10 years or to a fine or both.
27 Hansard, col. 535, 12 June 2006.
28 Ibid. The Solicitor-General also informed Parliament that this was currently the
subject of a review being led by the Attorney-General.
29 Ibid. This address also made reference to government appreciation of controversies
surrounding non-jury trials.
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will require proof of dishonesty.30 This is to be a question for fact-finders,
either juries or judges in the small number of fraud trials which will be
destined for judge-only trials (pursuant to s. 43 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2003), and to be determined according to the test laid down in R v
Ghosh.31
Shortly after the Fraud Bill’s initial presentation in Parliament in 2005
it was suggested that, for a number of reasons, fact-finders may experi-
ence difficulties in finding that a defendant charged with fraud has acted
dishonestly.32 This proposition was based upon the discussion of issues
pertaining to criminalising business activity, and also those arising in
respect of ‘everyday-life crime’. This present discussion seeks to build on
these foundational ideas by pointing to the significance for this debate
on law reform of the academic study of white-collar crime, which has
grown from the work of Edwin Sutherland. During the 1940s, Suther-
land coined the term ‘white-collar crime’ while studying criminal be-
haviour amongst professional classes, which could not be explained by
established theories which linked crime with poverty and its associated
pathologies.33 Sutherland’s most famous and controversial legacy is his
definition of ‘white collar crime’ as ‘crime committed by a person of
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.34
Today, scholars continue to be fascinated by white-collar crime, and it
has been suggested elsewhere that this richly textured and multidiscipli-
nary literature could have made a valuable contribution to the other-
wise lengthy consideration of fraud and the criminal law set in motion in
1998.35 Indeed, the Law Commission’s understanding of the ‘problem’
of fraud unveiled in 1999 mirrors almost exactly scholars’ views that
20th-century technological advances have transformed elemental ideas
of deceit which are as ‘old as ancient Egypt’36 into the ‘modern crime par
excellence’37 by inviting new types of crime, and also making ‘old kinds of
crime more freely available’.38 Beyond this, the value of this body of
literature for enriching understandings of the ‘problem’ of fraud is
considerable. This is on account of its intellectual consideration of the
30 Report on Fraud, para 7.3.
31 [1982] QB 1053. According to Ghosh conduct is dishonest if it is found that
ordinary people would regard it as such, and also that the defendant knew that
ordinary people would so regard it. Ghosh is a mechanism for the ‘ordinary
standards of reasonable and honest people’ to inform what is regarded as criminal
conduct, and is thus a way of ensuring that law and morality map coherently on
to one another.
32 See S. Wilson, ‘“Collaring” the Crime and the Criminal?: “Jury Psychology” and
Some Criminological Perspectives on Fraud and the Criminal Law’ (2006) 70 JCL
75–92.
33 See S. Shapiro, ‘Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept
of a White-Collar Crime’ (1990) 55 American Sociological Review 346 at 346–7.
34 E. H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: 1949) 9.
35 Indeed, it was suggested in Wilson (above n. 32) that there was no evidence to
suggest that any attention had been paid to the academic study of white-collar
crime during the Fraud Bill’s genesis or its initial appearance in Parliament.
36 A. Bequai, White Collar Crime: A 20th Century Crisis (Massachusetts, 1978) Preface
iii.
37 M. Levi, Regulating Fraud: White Collar Crime and the Criminal Process (Tavistock
Press: London, 1987) 1.
38 Ibid. at 3.
The Journal of Criminal Law
40
destructive capabilities of white-collar crimes; their ‘ambivalent’ nature,
and also the related ambiguities surrounding their ‘respectable’ perpe-
trators. More specifically, there appears to be within this literature base
substantial support for the authors’ concerns that the fraud offence may
not necessarily be able to increase effectiveness in criminal responses as
intended, and as believed by many.
The Fraud Bill’s original reception in Parliament was as a ‘model piece
of law reform’,39 and the optimism for the fraud offence within it
continued throughout the Bill’s journey through both Houses during
2006. Indeed, the tenor of the Solicitor-General’s address noted above
was very much that the Act will get the law right. At one level there
clearly are grounds for confidence, because fraud will actually be a
criminal offence in its own right, and, as recommended by the Law
Commission, will not be attached to identifying ‘specific types of dis-
honest behaviour as deserving of criminality’.40 Moreover, notwith-
standing the offence’s general nature, it does provide fact-finders with a
conduct-based framework for applying Ghosh.41 Further encouragement
can also be drawn from the way in which that, as the technical detail of
the offence (and indeed the other offences within the Bill) were worked
through, parliamentary debate during 2006 did emphasise the offence’s
significance and its potential radically to alter approaches to fraud.
Although this was the case during its initial reception in 2005, it was
suggested at the time that debate was too focused on the technical
aspects of the offence, and insufficient attention was being paid to ‘wider
perspectives’ on the seriousness of fraud.42 Not only was parliamentary
discussion of the seriousness of fraud during June 2006 the fullest which
had occurred at any stage of the Fraud Bill’s genesis, but its ‘wider’
implications were at that stage also insightfully being attached to the
way in which the government is seeking to formulate a coherent strat-
egy to ‘reduce the incidence of fraud and the harm to which it can
lead’.43
Furthermore, there did appear at this latter stage to be appreciation in
both Houses of popular perceptions which regard fraud as a ‘victimless’
crime. However, what has not attracted any attention is what might
actually inform conceptions of financial crimes as ones which are ‘vic-
timless’, beyond frequent but also fleeting reference to their secretive
nature and apparent lack of victim, and in some cases—for example, in
an insurance fraud—comparatively easy pecuniary gain. While there is
some appreciation of why it is important to break down conceptions that
fraud may be ‘victimless’, this is occurring largely without any reference
to how such perceptions have come into being. At one level it might not
39 See Wilson, above n. 32.
40 Report on Fraud, para. 7.2.
41 Contrast the Law Commission’s assessment (Report on Fraud, para. 1.6) of the then
current position in which none of the numerous charges that are brought in
relation to fraud ‘adequately describe or encapsulate the meaning of “fraud” in
circumstances where it falls to a jury to determine whether the defendant has
been dishonest’.
42 Wilson, above n. 32.
43 Hansard, col. 545, 12 June 2006.
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be difficult to see how insurance fraud or that associated with obtaining
credit facilities44 might appear ‘victimless’, but appreciation of how and
why conceptions of ‘harm’ may be absent from popular understandings
of financial crimes is more complex than this alone. There is much
evidence that British society has a highly ambivalent relationship with
non-violent crimes of financial dishonesty, particularly ones perpetrated
by respectable people, and this appears to overarch mixed perceptions of
victimisation and harm arising from fraud. This dimension appears to
have been absent from parliamentary discussions at all stages, and it is in
this light that reference to criminological study of white-collar crime can
reveal how important British societal understandings of ‘respectable
crime’ are to these critical policy debates.
Criminological study and popular perceptions of crime:
a lesson for fraud law reform
The work of Edwin Sutherland shows at one level how financial crimes
fit within a broader intellectual appreciation of white-collar crime.
Sutherland proposed that many of ‘[t]he varied types of white collar
crimes in business and the professions . . . can be reduced to two
categories’, the first of which was ‘misrepresentation of asset values’
which approximated with ‘fraud or swindling’.45 Today, within this
literature base, white-collar crime is frequently presented as crime of
ambiguity and ambivalence.46 This is readily apparent in representations
of scholars that it is ‘less’ deserving of the label of ‘crime’ than other
types of criminality, and even that the ‘[t]he Jekyll-and-Hyde nature of
crimes committed by the respectable raises questions unlike those posed
by other types of criminal behaviour’.47 Equally the literature alludes to
activity perceived as being more dangerous than other types of crime,
and even more criminal because its impact upon society dwarfs that of
other criminal behaviour. In this vein, a large body of work identifies the
huge pecuniary costs arising from white-collar crime which, unlike
many other so called ‘ordinary crimes’, victimises universally, silently
and indiscriminately.48 However, beyond this, scholars also speak of the
way in which inappropriate societal complacency has led to the emer-
gence of a dual system of justice and even ‘divided’ societies. This
44 These were illustrations of ‘everyday-life’ crime, also christened ‘respectable
opportunism’ in S. Karstedt and S. Farrall, ‘The Moral Maze of the Middle Class:
The Predatory Society and its Emerging Regulatory Order’ in H. J. Albrecht, T.
Serassis and H. Kania (eds), Images of Crime II: Representations of Crime and the
Criminal in Politics, Society, the Media and the Arts (Max Planck Institute: Freiburg,
2004), which was utilised in Wilson, above n. 32 at 88.
45 E. H. Sutherland, ‘White Collar Criminality’ (1940) 5 American Sociological Review 1
at 3: the other category amounted to crimes of corruption or ‘duplicity in the
manipulation of power’.
46 See V. Aubert, ‘White Collar Crime and Social Structure’ 58 American Journal of
Sociology (1952) 263 at 266, and D. Nelken, ‘White Collar Crime’ in M. Maguire et
al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
1994) 355 at 377.
47 Ibid. at 355.
48 See citation of G. S. Green, Occupational Crime (Nelson Hall: Chicago, 1990) in
Nelken, above n. 46 at 358, and also Bequai , above n. 36 at 4.
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reasoning proposes that the operation of dual systems of justice, with
one ‘for the masses, who commit traditional offenses, and the other for
a small select group of white-collar felons’,49 has led to societal divisions
which are as marked and as damaging as ones arising on grounds of
race.50 Notwithstanding that the literature points to huge differences in
opinion on the status and impact of white-collar crime, it is almost
universally represented as crime which does not ‘fit’ comfortably into
societal consciousness.
Thus much scholarly energy has been directed towards exploring
these activities, and their perpetrators who according to Sutherland
frequently ‘do not conform to the popular stereotype of “the criminal”’,
and who (rightly or wrongly) are not seen as ‘criminals in the usual
sense of the word’.51 Furthermore it is also the case that more ‘popular’
opinion on non-violent financial crimes is equally ‘mixed’, and many
direct and implied references are made by scholars to much more fixed
opinions on other more traditional types of crime. Michael Levi’s socially
superior ‘businessman criminal’52 serves as illustration, and while others
speak of the ‘myth’ of tolerance of white-collar crime,53 their work also
reveals highest levels of intolerance being attached to crimes involving
death or serious physical injury.54 However, the classic study by Stanton
Wheeler et al. from 1982 illustrates the repugnance which can be
directed towards people who commit crimes arising from greed, espe-
cially those who are pillars of respectable communities.55 This latter
sentiment can be found in more popular discourses which represent
convicted businessmen as ‘thieving millionaires’.56 However, it is also
the case that while for some there will be outrage that there can appear
to be ‘one law for the rich’,57 for others these activities will be seen as
‘victimless’ and lacking real harm, notwithstanding the elevated (and
even superior) position of their perpetrators, serving as a reminder of
how differently financial crimes are capable of being perceived.
This proposition of ambivalent societal perception is at the heart of
problems which might arise in securing convictions for fraud under the
new fraud offence. For example, it has already been suggested that ‘jury
49 Bequai, above n. 36, at 4.
50 Ibid.
51 E. H. Sutherland, ‘Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?’ (1945) 10 American Sociological
Review 132 at 137.
52 M. Levi, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: the Investigation, Prosecution, and
Trial of Serious Fraud (HMSO: London, 1993) 66. See also Wilson, above n. 32.
53 J. B. Braithwaite, P. N. Grabosky and P. R. Wilson, ‘The Myth of Community
Tolerance toward White-Collar Crime’ (1987) 20 Australia and New Zealand Journal
of Criminology 33.
54 Ibid. at 38–42. This included alongside violent homicide and ‘domestic’ violence
injuries industrially induced deaths and injuries and heroin trafficking. For a
consideration of burglary in this light, see the reference to R. Sparks, H. Genn and
D. Dodd, Surveying Victims (Wiley: Chichester, 1977) in Levi, above n. 37 at 63,
where it is proposed that ‘pound for pound, burglary is seen as being more serious
than embezzlement or cheque fraud’.
55 S. Wheeler, D. Weisburd, and N. Bode, ‘Sentencing the White Collar Offender:
Rhetoric and Reality’ (1982) 47 American Sociological Review 641.
56 M. Levi, ‘Sentencing White Collar Crime in the Dark?: Reflections on the
Guinness Four’ (1991) 28(4) Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 257 at 265.
57 Ibid.
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psychology’ (a term for the difficulties which can arise for juries in their
decision-making) might create concerns about determining that a ‘re-
spectable opportunist’ or businessman who is ‘socially superior’ has
acted dishonestly.58 It has also been noted that the new law might also
tap into judges’ anxieties about white-collar criminals. A number of
studies, including that of Wheeler et al., found that judges experienced
considerable difficulty in punishing those who have led otherwise ex-
emplary lives as trusted and respected members of communities, but
whose fraudulent behaviour has often violated the very trust and es-
teem underpinning this.59 Although regard is given to an offender’s
previous record (or absence of it) across sentencing practice and across
the spectrum of criminal activity, in order to ensure ‘proportionality and
. . . that the appropriate sentence is delivered for the offence that was
committed’,60 Levi’s UK work suggests that ‘sentencing white-collar
crimes committed by people with no prior convictions’ might place
particular pressure on judges. This is on account that such cases raise ‘in
an acute form conflicts between principles of social equity and general
deterrability, on the one hand, and individual deterrence or rehabilita-
tion on the other’.61
In this vein, Levi also alluded to judges being sensitive to ‘prospective
media and social criticism’ because of fears that any perceived ‘excessive
leniency’ will undermine public beliefs about the fairness of law.62 This
could also point to discomfort being closely connected with judicial
consciousness of ambiguities in more popular perceptions of white-collar
crimes and their perpetrators. On this reasoning, judicial sensitivity is
also likely to be shaped by the way in which notwithstanding the
destructive capabilities of financial crimes, popular perceptions do not
always align fraud with ‘serious crime’, and this is likely to be height-
ened further for those who become ‘fact-finders’ in fraud trials. In these
circumstances, judges will be even more acutely aware of perceptions
(and especially ambivalent and unsettled ones) that fraudsters have too
much in common with ‘respectable people’, and their activities run too
closely to too many respectable lives for there to be unqualified endorse-
ment that they must be ‘investigated as criminals, tried as criminals and
punished as criminals’, as former Serious Fraud Office director Rosalind
Wright insists fraudsters must be.63
58 Report on Fraud, paras 5.41–5.44. This was of course the core argument in Wilson,
above n. 32.
59 Wheeler et al., above n. 55.
60 Solicitor-General, Mike O’Brien addressing the House of Commons, Hansard, col.
537, 12 June 2006.
61 Levi, above n. 56 at 257.
62 Ibid. at 257–8. According to Levi judges may also fear that perceived ‘excessive
lenience’ will also undermine the efforts of the SFO and the UK’s reputation as a
regulatory environment which does not tolerate fraud.
63 R. Wright, ‘Fighting Fraud in the UK—The Interaction of the Criminal and the
Regulatory Process’ at the Financial Regulation Industry Group Reception, 25 May
2000, London.
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Academic discourses and real issues: can the fraud
offence ‘get the law right’?
Although there are a number of possible readings of the ‘problem’ of
fraud, it is a serious problem, and throughout 2006 ministers, Members
and peers were keen to stress that it is a mistake to view it as a
‘victimless’ crime. Thus, the new package of responses—of which the
fraud offence forms part—is very important, as the latter parliamentary
debates clearly did appreciate. However, it is also vital that the new
responses are accompanied by emphasis on changing perceptual appre-
ciations of it. Although there is some recognition of this in articulations
of the fallacy of ‘victimless crime’, this has not been linked explicitly
with underlying lack of consensus on the ‘problem’ of fraud. In this
climate, the fraud offence is in danger of becoming a dead letter unless
British society becomes more prepared to acknowledge both that busi-
ness people are capable of being criminals, and accept that the activities
of respectable middle class ‘opportunists’—such as insurance fraud—can
be economically and socially injurious, and are not acceptable. Unless
there is societal acceptance that fraud needs to be treated as behaviour to
which criminal processes and consequences attach, then fraud under
the fraud offence is in danger of becoming what Michael Ashe QC
coined, in the context of insider dealing, ‘convictionless’ crime.64
In considering how to proceed with clarifying perceptions of financial
crime to allow the fraud offence to work, it is very important to be aware
of academic considerations of whether white-collar crimes are different
from other types of crime qualitatively, and are appropriately regarded
as being ‘less criminal’ than activities more readily regarded as criminal
activities. This also requires appreciation of alternative reasoning that it
is not qualitative distinctiveness which is responsible for more equivocal
feelings towards financial crime, but social constructions which have
created a ‘smokescreen’ based on prejudice and misunderstanding.65
This latter proposition suggests that societal opinion on white-collar
crime is less settled not simply because the secretive nature of fraud
makes it less visible than other crimes,66 but because for activities
detected, criminal enforcement is frequently the ‘road not taken’,67
which in turn for many is a reflection of socio-political indifference.68
64 T. M. Ashe and L. Counsell, Insider Trading (Tolley: London, 1993) 17. Although
this work is specifically a study of insider dealing, many of its authors’
observations can be applied more generally across the spectrum of ‘respectable
crime’. Most significantly, in the context of this article, Ashe explicitly connects
‘convictionless crime’ with conduct perceived as being ‘victimless’.
65 A thoughtful and balanced presentation of both positions can be found in Nelken,
above n. 46.
66 Levi, above n. 37 at 6 makes reference to the ‘dark figure’ of ‘fraud and
unprosecuted fraudsters’. See also ‘dark figure’ observations in M. Levi,
‘Regulating Fraud Revisited’ in P. Davies, P. Francis and V. Jupp (eds), Invisible
Crimes: Their Victims and their Regulation (MacMillan: Basingstoke, 1999) 143.
67 S. Shapiro, ‘The Road Not Taken: The Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for
White Collar Offenders’ (1985) 19 Law and Society Review 179.
68 Bequai, above n. 36, Preface.
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Awareness of these perspectives is essential for appreciating that percep-
tions of financial crimes are very mixed, and in some respects actually
conflicted. 
However, as part of this, there must also be understanding of the way
in which British society has a long-standing ambivalent relationship
with non-violent financial crimes, and especially those committed by
‘respectable people’. This relationship with criminal activities commonly
found collected under the common parlance of ‘fraud’ is one which
appears to have lacked clarity and comfort since the Victorian discovery
of financial crime. This proposition can itself be couched within British
societal attitudes towards crime which emerged at the beginning of the
19th century. Historians of crime have long proffered the view that for
society at this time crime was the province of the dangerous ‘criminal
classes’ (in contemporary parlance a euphemism for the lower classes)
who were ‘antithetic of every respectable community’.69 Significantly,
these societal perceptions of crime and deviance were very strongly
influenced by the pertaining political climate of the early 19th century.
This climate advocated movement away from traditional approaches to
crime which rested on community-based policing which was character-
istically non-intensive70 (manifesting a high community tolerance of
low level and typically ‘petty’ crimes71), but set against the backdrop of
the extensive Bloody Code of criminal laws, which provided capital
punishment for large numbers of crimes.72
In light of industrialisation, and pressures arising from growing
doubts on the deterrent effect of the Bloody Code, and also the
Enlightenment-influenced humanitarian movement for reform, funda-
mental alterations to the relationship between crime policing and pun-
ishment started to occur during the early years of the 19th century. The
‘revolutions’ in policing73 and penal policy74 were strongly influenced by
Sir Robert Peel’s input as Home Secretary, and were a crucial element of
69 See U. Henriques, ‘The Rise and Decline of the Separate System of Prison
Discipline’ (1972) 54 Past and Present 61 at 83.
70 See, e.g., C. Emsley, Policing in its Context (MacMillan: Basingstoke, 1983) 20, and
especially at 28.
71 Ibid. And indeed, this was an important trade off for non-invasive policing which
was deep rooted in 18th-century British psyche, as was its underlying suspicion of
anything which might interfere with English liberties (namely, anything associated
with England’s traditional enemy France, and not least its notorious gens d’Amérie).
72 It is also the case that a range of secondary punishments—including transportation
and ‘physical’ punishments of whipping, branding and pillory, etc.—operated
alongside the capital sanction. Further illumination of this, and the way in which
considerable and ever-increasing reliance was being placed on the threat of the
capital sanction to deter the commission of crime can be found in D. Eastwood,
Governing Rural England: Tradition and Transformation in Local Government 1780–1840
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993) especially 190–209 and 253–4.
73 See D. J. V. Jones, ‘The New Police: Crime, and People in England and Wales,
1829–1888’ (1983) 33 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 161, and also
C. Emsley, ‘The Bedfordshire Police 1840–1856: A Case Study in the Working of
the Rural Constabulary Act’ (1982) 7 Midland History 73 especially at 80–6.
74 For example, see U. Henriques, above n. 69, and also M. Ignatieff, A Just Measure
of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1980). More recently there is also M. Wiener, Reconstructing the
Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England 1830–1914 (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1990).
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his commitment to dismantling the Bloody Code and putting in place
the foundations of modern criminal law and accompanying frameworks
of criminal culpability.75 Increasing the translation of crimes committed
into crimes punished was key to this new approach, at the heart of
which was efficiency in policing, but this was also highly controversial in
a society which held dear the liberties of the ‘free-born Englishman’.
What flowed from this was political appreciation of the need to convey
that crime was a growing and increasingly ubiquitous problem.76 Be-
yond Peel’s reforms, reforming bureaucrat Edwin Chadwick continued
to emphasise, most famously as an advocate of modernising policing
during the 1830s, that crime was a problem for every respectable
community.77
However, it is also the case that during the 1840s Victorian society
became acquainted with what contemporary financial commentator
D. M. Evans christened ‘high-art crime’. Evans remarked that following
the 1840s market crash resulting from over-speculation in railway com-
panies ‘[the offences of] fraud and forgery and misappropriation’ were
‘called into existence’, along with their ‘frightful and heavy legal
responsibilities’.78 However, although Evans was clearly appalled by the
unifying motivation to ‘make money easily and in a hurry’, harboured
by all from ‘the gigantic forger or swindler’ who wished to outshine
those around him to the ‘reckless speculator’ prepared to ‘risk every-
thing in the hope of sudden gain, rather than toil safely for a distant
reward’ and even the apprentice boy who robbed a few shillings from
the till ‘so that he may enjoy himself on a particular evening’79 other
parts of his commentary on ‘the inauguration, development, and rapid
progress’ of high-art crime80 reveal quite different reactions. This is
because Evans also alluded to this being a ‘distinct’ type of crime
motivated by factors other than poverty and adversity associated with
the ‘criminal classes’.
Evans insisted that the perpetrators of high-art crime were not like
the ‘many thousands, unfortunately in every large community who are
born, bred and nurtured into crime, and who resort to it naturally and
from necessity’.81 High-art criminals were instead induced by tempta-
tion to tamper with the weighty trusts reposed in them, and many did so
in order to fund extravagant lifestyles. Evans also recognised that temp-
tation could arise from the desperation of a businessman on the brink of
financial ruin, but he believed these occurrences were frequently the
75 See A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law
(Widenfield and Nicholson: London, 1993) especially at 83–4. More extensive
consideration of the impact of the 19th-century politicisation of crime and deviance
upon current perceptual appreciation of financial crimes, in light of current political
policy on financial crime is being made elsewhere (see below n. 107).
76 See S. Wilson, Invisible Criminals?: Legal, Social and Cultural Perspectives on Financial
Crime in Britain 1800–1930 (unpublished doctoral thesis, 2003).
77 Jones, above n. 73.
78 D. M. Evans, Facts, Failures and Frauds: Revelations Financial, Mercantile, Criminal
(Groombridge: London, 1859) 5.
79 Ibid. at 1–2.
80 Ibid. at 1.
81 Ibid. at 391.
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result of indulgence in ‘ill-considered enterprises’,82 and on one occa-
sion declared that ‘no crime can be more heinous against society . . .
than a breach of mercantile trust’.83 Thus, notwithstanding his own
‘ambiguities’, Evans did in many respects believe that while capable of
being ‘heinous’, high-art crime was also something quite distinct from
what writers of a modern persuasion might call ‘ordinary’ crime or
‘traditional’ crime.
Current difficulties and long-standing attitudinal
patterns
According to historian Martin Wiener, financial crimes were amongst a
number of new crimes discovered in the 19th century which implicated
the respectable in ways which traditional crimes rarely had.84 However,
unlike Wiener’s other examples of poisoning and blackmail, financial
crimes would present particular challenges, because according to Edwin
Chadwick they were ‘divested of animosity on the part of the offender,
of physical injury and physical alarm to the party defrauded’.85 In 1839
Chadwick suggested that the recently observed increase in fraudulent
crimes had accompanied a recorded decline in violent crimes, and this
signalled a less barbarous society. Violent crimes were of course at the
extreme end of Chadwick’s ‘one great criminal profession’, to which
‘habitual depredators’ such as ‘[t]hieves, prostitutes, &c, seem to be-
long’,86 through which he communicated his warnings about the dan-
gers of crime. Thus, alongside and against such activities it is not difficult
to see that fraudulent crimes might have appeared less concerning. 
However, Chadwick also intimated that fraudulent crimes may not
actually require the same responses as the ‘[t]hieves, prostitutes & c’
who—violent or otherwise—were the scourge of respectable commun-
ities, because such activities ‘yield more readily to available remedies, in
the shape of obstacles which may be interposed to render the offence
more difficult, dangerous and unprofitable’.87 Thus distinctions between
‘traditional’ crime and ‘other’ types of deviance were being discussed by
criminal policy-makers even prior to the market crash of the 1840s. This
is highly significant because the events of the 1840s appear to have been
critical in creating perceptual awareness that financial crimes were
capable of amounting to ‘infamous’ crime, which if allowed to go
unpunished ‘would be a disgrace to the law of any country’.88 Never-
theless, in these earlier years there was suggestion that fraudulent
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. at 123.
84 Wiener, above n. 74 at 244.
85 Report from the Royal Commission on the Constabulary Force, P. P. 1839 XIX (169) 49
(hereafter Rural Constabulary Report).
86 Rural Constabulary Report, 8 and 15.
87 Ibid. at 49.
88 In the words of Lord Campbell, presiding over the trial of the directors of the
Royal British Bank at the Central Criminal Court, 1858. See S. Wilson, ‘Law,
Morality, and Regulation: Victorian Experiences of Financial Crime’ (2006) 46
British Journal of Criminology 1073–90.
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activities did not necessarily require the same responses as the activities
of ‘habitual depredators’. 
In the criminal trials which followed the aftermath of the railway
boom there is much which is interesting about the ways in which
prosecutors actively pushed the proposition of criminal liability for
‘business crime’. It is, for example, apparent from the earliest fraud trials
how the proceedings reflected key concerns of business failure and the
limits of legitimate risk-taking and acceptable business conduct, as Vic-
torian society struggled with the implications of a developing, and
highly dynamic and also little-regulated capitalist economy. It is also
interesting to see how alongside this, the proceedings also became
extensive discussions of expectations pertaining to occupational conduct
arising from personal morality, pursued through reference to defendants’
respectability and esteem.89 Both these themes are of course dominant
in discourses today: forming the basis of contentions that white-collar
crime is different from other types of crime and this has to be reflected
in approaches to it, but also others which suggest that it is inappro-
priately treated as ‘lesser crime’ or ‘not real crime’. But for the purposes
of this discussion on ambiguous perceptions of white-collar crime, the
trials also reveal judges trying to reason and explain the occurrence of
activity which while it was unacceptable in many respects did not really
‘fit’ comfortably into prevailing societal stereotypings of crime and
deviance.
Dating from times when Enlightenment associationalist ideologies
were dominant within penal thought and policy, proffering that crime
was not a product of birth, but instead a product of social dysfunction
(people were not born evil, they were instead made evil by society90)
judges in the earliest fraud trials explored the ways in which business
crimes committed by respectable people—while capable of being ‘in-
famous’ and warranting punishment—could be very different from ones
which were rooted in poverty and hostile social conditions. The trial of
London bankers Strahan, Bates and Paul in 1855 for their embezzle-
ment of moneys entrusted to them as bankers reveals how, in these
proceedings, financial dishonesty was often contrasted with the activ-
ities of those described as ‘common felons’, and from ‘lower conditions
of life’.91 Although the prisoners were sentenced to transportation for a
period of 14 years following their conviction for a crime described by
presiding Baron Alderson as the most serious which could be imagined
in a ‘great commercial community like this’, the judge described his duty
to pass sentence as a painful one because prior to appearing before him
‘in the prisoners’ dock’ they had once ‘moved in a position of society’.
Furthermore, when pronouncing sentence upon Joseph Windle Cole for
dockyard warrant frauds perpetrated in 1854, Lord Chief Baron Pollock
compared Cole’s conduct with: ‘[t]he dishonest acts of many thousands
89 Ibid. for fuller consideration of both themes.
90 See Ignatieff, above n. 74.
91 The Trial of Strahan, Bates and Paul (1855) at the Central Criminal Court, London
on charges relating to their embezzlement of moneys entrusted to them as
bankers, as fully transcribed in Evans, above n. 78 at 125–45.
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who have poverty, want, bad education and worse bad example as
possibly some extenuation of their offences’. He alleged that this made
Cole’s crimes, committed out of self-interest ‘[a]mongst the worst that
can be brought under the notice of a court’.92
This comment proposed that crimes committed out of greed were
more reprehensible than crimes committed out of need, but a distinction
between them was nevertheless drawn. It is highly likely that this
Enlightenment-influenced commentary contributed to strengthening
opinion that crimes of deceit and dishonesty in pursuit of greed and self-
promotion were socially injurious, and possibly especially reprehens-
ible.93 Equally it was becoming apparent in the same discourses that
such activities committed by those who had been reduced to the position
of ‘common felons’ would not obviously be regarded in the same way as
crimes committed by those who were common felons and these situations
were somehow different. Then as now, there was ‘strong sentiment
against crimes of greed rather than need, against crimes committed by
persons in positions of trust and authority’,94 while definite references
were also made to crime which was not necessarily the ‘same as’ that
arising from ‘lower conditions of life’ and which may not necessarily
require the same responses. 
Over 50 years after these earliest fraud trials from the 1850s, work
commissioned from forensic statistician Dr Charles Goring in 191395 was
instrumental in establishing a more aggressive approach to prosecutions
of fraud, and ultimately paved the way for establishment of the Fraud
Squad in 1946.96 Goring’s legacy also illuminates the complexities which
continued to pervade social and legal acceptance of white-collar crime
during the early 20th century. In Goring’s opinion criminals he identi-
fied as ‘Fraudulent criminals’ had far more in common with the law
abiding sections of society than with those who committed other types
of crimes, in terms of their ‘marriage rates, occupation and other social
conditions—including low degrees of alcoholism and higher than aver-
age intelligence and education’. They were far removed from ‘Habitual
criminals’ who were incorrigible law-breakers, and who were the fur-
thest removed from ordinary law-abiding citizens.97 The apparent para-
dox within Goring’s legacy of intensification of response to ‘respectable
crime’ and his thoughts on the criminal activities of those who had more
in common with law-abiding citizens than the ‘criminal population’ can
also be read in a way which warns of the challenges lying ahead of the
fraud offence, almost a century later.
The contemporary package of responses designed to increase effec-
tiveness in detection and effective prosecution along with ‘getting the
law right’ thus needs to acknowledge that many potential fraudsters will
92 The Trial of Joseph Windle Cole at the Central Criminal Court, 26 October 1854,
fully transcribed in Evans, above n.78 at 197–225.
93 See Wheeler et al., above n. 55 at 657.
94 Ibid.
95 C. Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Survey (HMSO: London, 1913).
96 D. J. V. Jones, Crime, Protest, Community and Police in Nineteenth Century Britain
(Routledge: London, 1982).
97 Goring, above n. 95 at 46.
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have much in common with those who are, if not respectable, at least
normatively lawful. In the earliest years of the 20th century Goring had
some difficulties in reconciling financial criminals as criminals, and
today these problems remain for fact-finders within the criminal process
who are closest ‘to the problem, facing it every week’.98 For such fact-
finders, notwithstanding the destructive capabilities of financial crimes,
their acceptance as criminal activities remains problematic. In the case of
everyday-life crime Karstedt and Farrall found that ‘respectable (and
outwardly normatively lawful) people’ have difficulties in regarding
respectable opportunism, such as insurance fraud, as anything more
serious than that. Equally, for many, any perceived social superiority of
businessmen is also accompanied by too great a distance from the ‘crime
scene’ located within the commercial sphere.99
Making the law work: a way forward and some
concluding thoughts
While the Solicitor-General remarked in June 2006 that ‘[t]he Bill will
not be a panacea for preventing fraud’ and even that ‘[w]e should not
overrate the capacity of the criminal law alone to solve this or any other
problem’,100 this comment appears to have been framed in order to
emphasise the new substantive law as part of a strategic ‘package’ of
responses, targeting fraud on a number of fronts. However, it could
equally be a prelude to the proposition that the fraud offence will only
‘get the law right’ if juries and judges are prepared to find that a
defendant has acted dishonestly in making a representation, in failing to
disclose information while under a legal duty, or has abused a position of
trust. This requires societal acceptance that this underlying behaviour is
unacceptable, which is in turn premised on achieving much greater
perceptual acceptance of fraud as crime than is currently the case. It is
here that academic analysis (cast around different perspectives on
whether fraud is real crime and should not be treated any differently
from other types of crime) which identifies and explains that percep-
tions are unsettled is a starting-point for clarifying in societal conscious-
ness that fraud is serious and it is unacceptable. However, just as scholars
remain divided around the ambiguous nature of white-collar crimes,
achieving popular consensus about fraud will remain difficult if pursued
on this reasoning alone, which involves making comparisons between
different types of crime where ‘the notion of disparity assumes we are
comparing like with like, and it is precisely this that is so difficult’.101
98 Wheeler et al., above n. 55 at 658.
99 Both Levi, above n. 52 and Karstedt and Farrall, above n. 44 were central to the
initial observations made in Wilson, above n. 32.
100 Hansard, col. 545, 12 June 2006.
101 M. Levi, ‘Fraudulent Justice?: Sentencing the Business Criminal’ in P. Carlen and
D. Cook (eds), Paying for Crime (Open University Press: Milton Keynes, 1989) 88 at
100. Although made in the context of sentencing fraudsters, this quote also
illustrates the difficulties which are inherent in assuming that comparisons
between different types of crime can unproblematically be made.
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Thus, while it is important to communicate that there are ambivalences
in societal perceptions of fraud, a more constructive way of clarifying
that financial crimes have serious consequences for everyone is to focus
on explaining why fraud is serious conduct which requires the backing of
criminal sanctions. At one level this is what the parliamentary discus-
sions on the Fraud Bill were doing, by articulating fraud through the
language of harm, and explaining that it needs to be understood that
‘[d]espite the public perception that most fraud is victimless crime . . .
[we] all pay higher prices for security systems, banking services, credit
and goods, and higher premiums for insurance’.102 There is also some
evidence that this is being pursued by reference to the capacity for
‘business fraud’ to affect everyone by destabalising the UK economy and
its reputational standing in an increasingly globalised and competitive
world marketplace which is dominated by uncertainty and insecurity as
well as opportunity. The address of Brian Jenkins, Member for Tam-
worth, makes particularly striking reference to the considerable reach of
harms arising from fraud in his contention that in one respect fraud
‘costs the people of our country dear’ by hitting ‘the pockets of individ-
uals’ and creating ‘misery for many families’. Equally he described fraud
as anything but victimless, and instead an ‘insidious and indiscriminate
crime which wreaks long-term damage on UK business’.103
There does however need to be much fuller discussion of how the
need to break down perceptions of fraud as victimless crime might be
linked to concerns that the fraud offence might give rise to ‘conviction-
less’ crime. This is vital because, as Jeremy Wright, Member for Rugby
and Kenilworth, noted, the new law is seeking to address fraudsters’
intentions, rather than seeking to ‘measure’ the outcomes or conse-
quences of a successful fraud:104 the fraud offence does so by asking
whether the defendant was dishonest. However, the Member’s observa-
tions as a non-practising barrister that ‘juries are well able to deal with
the matters put before them in a fraud trial, so long as lawyers putting
those matters before them do so in a straightforward way’105 reiterates a
crucial underlying point. This is that the ability of the fraud offence to
‘get the law right’ requires society—where appropriate—not to shy
away from accepting that business men should incur criminal liability
for behaving in a manner which is injurious to societal interests106 and
acceptance that ‘respectable opportunism’ contributes to the huge costs
attributable to fraud. 
102 Hansard, col. 534, 12 June 2006.
103 Ibid. at col. 565 (indeed according to Solicitor-General Mike O’Brien (Hansard, col.
534, 12 June 2006) fraud costs the average household £650 per year).
104 Ibid. at col. 563.
105 Ibid.
106 The authors’ view is that this message must be accompanied by the equally
important one that criminalising business activity must seek to discourage
behaviour which can undermine societal interests whilst acknowledging that
entrepreneurial activity is vital for our economic and wider societal well-being.
The proposition that the limits of lawful business activity must appreciate that
legitimate risks will not always ‘pay off’, and that failed ventures are not
necessarily criminally culpable ones, is currently being considered more fully by
the authors.
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However, messages against tolerance of fraud will have only limited
impact unless they are communicated more widely than in Hansard
reportings alone. What is required instead is extensive and effective
communication and education about the harms arising from fraud, and
a detailed consideration of how this might be conducted is being made
elsewhere.107 For present purposes, and in anticipation of fuller discus-
sion, one obvious starting point is for those who have recently con-
cluded debating the new law in Parliament to play a key role in
communicating the ‘problem of fraud’ into wider societal spheres. In
this vein, the observations made above by Jeremy Wright MP in relation
to jurors could be directed to suggest to those in Parliament that public
opinion will respond very positively to ‘matters put before it’ as long as
this is done in a ‘straightforward way’ by key policy-makers. An ex-
ploration is currently being made of how media attention given to crime
and punishment108 might be a key element in communication that
activities which result in higher prices for ‘security systems, banking
services, credit and goods, and . . . insurance’, and cost UK business by
‘undermining confidence in the institutions which are needed to trade
and create wealth’109 are serious crimes, and ones which as a society we
have a responsibility to treat as such. Until this happens, serious con-
cerns remain over whether the new fraud offence will ‘get the law right’
because this message is simply not being communicated either directly
enough or sufficiently extensively in popular discourse.
107 And indeed is the subject-matter of the further discussion signposted at n. 75
above.
108 This will consider how parliamentary discussions might be communicated through
mass media, and reflect on a number of key considerations pertaining to this. It
will look at representations of crime and punishment in mass media and the
interactions between popular perceptions and media representations; and also at
closely related issues of public sensitivity to media reporting, and how any
resulting perceptual awareness might be manipulated in particular directions by
specific media reporting.
109 Hansard, col. 565, 12 June 2006.
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